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HomeNewsDemocratic stability with asterisks: Greek politics in the post-crisis era

Democratic stability with asterisks: Greek politics in the post-crisis era

Gerard McGovern, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos

Despite the impact of successive economic, immigration and healthcare crises, as well as tensions with neighbouring countries, Greece has achieved democratic stability. The country now needs to focus on the further modernization of its public administration, justice, education and welfare systems in order to converge with other EU member states in terms of efficiency and social cohesion.

After Greece overcame multiple crises, its politics stopped making headlines in the international press. The economic crisis of 2010-18 partly coincided with the migration and refugee crisis (2015-16). This was then followed by the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-22) and the full-fledged war in Ukraine, which simultaneously affected many other countries. During the economic crisis, the political party system imploded as the mainstream parties were defeated in elections. At the same time, large-scale political protests accompanied the adoption of economic austerity policies. The migration and refugee crisis tested the country’s administrative institutions and its relations with other EU and neighbouring countries, while COVID-19 put strain on Greece’s national health system. The war in Ukraine contributed to rising energy prices and inflation, as prices of consumer goods increased sharply, testing the purchasing capacity of poorer households. Political, economic, migration and public health problems, owed to these aforementioned challenges, remain to this day. However, the nation’s democratic institutions and processes have not yet crumbled. Greek democracy has survived against all the odds.

The national parliamentary elections of 2015, 2019 and 2023 have allowed for smooth transitions of power. The far-left Syriza party was in power in a coalition with the radical right party Anel in 2015-19. This was then replaced by the centre-right New Democracy (ND) party. This group won two consecutive elections, in 2019 and 2023, and was able to form single-party majority governments. Ιn the past, political parties, propelled by the effectively majoritarian Greek electoral system, had frequently formed single-party governments. However, the current situation is unique. The winner of the elections of 2023, New Democracy, finished in the first-past-the-post system 23 percentage points ahead of the party that came second, Syriza. The last time such a wide gulf in performance occurred was in the elections of 1974, when ND won 54% of the vote and the second runner obtained only 20%. A similar but much less pronounced difference was seen in 1981, when the Socialist party, PASOK, won 48% of the vote against ND’s 35%. In contrast to the first phase of the economic crisis (2010-14), over the last ten years government stability has been attained under different governments of the left and the right.

Political transformations

However, five recent trends are noteworthy. First, the governing party (ND) has achieved and retained a solid electoral base and a corresponding hegemony in post-crisis Greek politics. As already noted, ND obtained almost 40% in 2019 and surpassed this in 2023 (in the second of two consecutive elections that year, as the first was inconclusive). ND owed its stable and high electoral performance to several factors. First, the Greek economy grew by 8% in 2021 (the EU average was 6%) and by 6% in 2022 (EU average was 3%), while real GDP per capita increased from 16,150 euros in 2020 to 18,710 euros in 2022. The government, drawing on the state budget and EU funds, also made ample social transfers to the weakest businesses and households to mitigate the negative impact of COVID-19. Finally, the government skillfully managed Greece’s complicated relations with Turkey and North Macedonia.

Second, while Syriza remained the largest party of the opposition, its electoral performance declined dramatically, from more than 30% of the vote in 2019 to less than 20% in 2023. After falling from power in 2019, the party neither adapted to the post-crisis situation nor did it alter at all its top political personnel. Syriza repeated the same polarizing opposition strategy and political discourse on society’s worsening impoverishment which it had successfully used before 2015 to rise to power at the peak of the economic crisis. However, Greece in 2023 was a totally different country from the one that found itself in the economic crisis.

Third, other opposition parties to the right and to the left of ND have become weaker over time, as they have witnessed not only electoral defeat but also internal splits. Thus, today, to the right of ND there are three small far-right parties represented in the Greek parliament. To the left of ND, except for Syriza, there is the socialist party PASOK, which governed the country through single-party majority governments for most of the years between the transition from the “Colonels’ Regime” (1974) and the start of the economic crisis (2010). However, since the start of the market troubles, PASOK has polled only between 5 to 12% of the vote. There are also the communists, who enjoy the support of a maximum of 10% of voters, and the Course of Freedom, a tiny left-wing personalistic party. Moreover, in December 2023, one fifth of Syriza’s MPs split off and created their own left party. This is because they did not accept the change of leadership of Syriza through party elections. As a result, there are now nine parties in parliament.

Fourth, as in other European democracies, readership of political newspapers has declined over time and the same decrease holds true for voter turnout in elections. Participation in elections decreased from almost 65% in January 2015 to below 55% in June 2023. Greeks are not as immersed in political conflict as they used to be.

And fifth, since mid-2022 there have been allegations against the ND government concerning violations of citizens and politicians’ right to privacy. It was revealed in the media that the phones of certain journalists reporting on immigration into Greece, and politicians, including the leader of the PASOK party and government ministers of the ND party, had been wiretapped. Greece’s National Intelligence Service (the “EYP”) has been implicated in this affair but the government has denied responsibility. Prosecutors are still investigating the case.

In brief, after the crisis, there has been government stability, accompanied by instability in the party system and rising apathy. However, it is no surprise that ND, which governed from 2019 to 2023, will hold onto government for a second four year-long period. This is a common pattern for mainstream parties (ND and PASOK) in contemporary Greek politics. It is also not a novel phenomenon that the governing party wins over 40% of the vote, leaving all the other parties behind in the electoral contest.

Checks on the government

Governing parties in Greece are held to account not only by the parliamentary opposition but also by a relatively independent justice system, which has ruled against unconstitutional laws that were adopted in the past by centre-right, centre-left and left-wing governments. Much like previous governments in the past, ND today is careful not to pass legislation that will be struck down by the country’s courts. The justice system, however, is very slow and inefficient. It has not been able to process cases of corruption that, according to Transparency International, have been rising in Greece since 2012.

The government is also challenged to an extent by the press. While there is a restricted “oligopolistic” structure in the country’s print and electronic media regarding newspapers, TV and radio stations, there is also wide-ranging political pluralism. This covers the whole spectrum from the far right to the far left. There are also flourishing social media platforms and websites to which the younger generations turn for information and debate. Successive governments have controlled the state TV and radio channels, although such control has gradually become less pronounced. The largest private TV channels, which are much more influential than the state ones, are not strongly tied to the government, as is the case in many other East and South-East European democracies. Private media is owned by businessmen who turn either in favour or against the government depending on their prospects to do business with the state. For example, this may happen as a result of winning or losing public procurement tenders. After the period of instability in 2015-16, which was marked by Syriza’s clash with EU decision-makers, some popular TV stations and newspapers supported ND more than other parties. This was true while it was in opposition and also after it rose to government (in 2019). However, no government feels secure regarding media support because it can change overnight.

Finally, as the large-scale protests during the Greek crisis made apparent, there are social movements and a strong trade union movement that can also check the government. Although the largest confederations of trade unions (GSEE in the private sector and ADEDY in the civil service) are fragmented along party lines and do not have the mobilization capacities they used to have, in certain economic sectors there are strong federations of trade unions and professional associations (e.g., among lawyers, engineers and doctors). They were not able to fend off salary cuts and higher taxes during the economic crisis, but they can still make their presence felt when reforms related to taxation or access to occupational rights are attempted.

Lingering problems

Greek democracy does not so much face political as social problems which are chronic and have not been adequately addressed by successive governments. More concretely, relations between the state administration and society have improved over time, particularly because of the rapid digitalization of public services offered to businesses and citizens. Yet, the efficiency of the administration is far below what further economic development and digital transformation would require. The administrative capacity to carry out tasks in a quick, fair and efficient manner is still limited. The justice system has not adapted to modern management methods. The education system is being modernized, but is still understaffed, while the performance of pupils and students leaves a lot to be desired. The health system operates in an unpredictable and uneven manner. Very high-quality and efficient medical services are offered in some public hospitals, whereas unacceptably low-quality services for patients are common in other ones. The welfare services still leave regional and inner-city pockets of poverty unattended, while long-term economic inequalities, albeit not as acute as during the crisis years, persist. Citizens of Greek democracy justifiably expect much more on all these fronts.

To sum up, ND has won the elections and thus a second term in government, as has often been the case in Greek politics. Greek democracy has overcome the grave instability it experienced during the economic crisis of the previous decade. It is a resilient democracy, but it has not been able to rise to the challenges posed by the substandard operation of the state administration and justice system, lingering economic inequalities, and the very uneven quality of welfare services. In conclusion, one could put some asterisks in any appraisal of Greece’s liberal democracy. However, in the long-term perspective one can see more progress in democracy than backsliding.

Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos is professor of political science at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and visiting fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, Florence.

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