Italy has long faced certain challenges related to democratic governance and has often been viewed within the EU as a state with persistent issues—for example, a higher level of corruption and substantial support for populism or parties headed by strong leaders often relativizing or even affirming the fascist legacy. Nevertheless, compared with many EU member states, Italy’s democracy now appears relatively stable. This does not imply, however, that there are no serious challenges that require attention or that might raise concern.
At the beginning of December (2-5 Dec) our group of experts from Poland and Italy (Adam Bacler, Fabio Turco, professor Maria Wincławska) visited Bologna and Milan to meet local political scientists, sociologists, journalists and think tank experts to talk about the current state of Italian democracy and the impact that Italian policy has on the European Union and its initiatives. The visit was organized within the framework of the project “Protecting European Values” co-funded by the European Commission.
Our first interviewer was Daniela Giannetti, professor of political science at the Bologna University. Professor Giannetti pointed out that Giorgia Meloni’s government demonstrates unprecedented stability with around 30% of voters supporting her party (Fratelli d’Italia), attributed to her coalition management and consistent leadership. The divided opposition struggles to form a unified “Campo Largo” coalition, weakening prospects of its victory, while the government assures a small stability and predictability. Public anxieties focus mainly on low purchasing power or micro-criminality, rather than possible challenges to democracy originating from the institutional reforms pursued by the government.
Next, we met with Paul Matthew Loveless, associate professor of political science at Bologna University. According to professor Loveless, Meloni balances international diplomacy with populist rhetoric, echoing Donald Trump’s resilience. Regional diversity, locality, and personality-driven politics based on loyalty shape voter behavior in Italy, while Europe’s rightward shift amplifies her appeal. Professor Loveless claims that the political predominance of Giorgia Meloni reflects entrenched cultural conservatism and post-fascist nationalism and fears of chronic instability, mostly connected with economic deficiencies and weak state institutions.
The Bolonian part of the visit concluded with the meeting with Gianfranco Baldini who paid attention to fascism sentiment spreading in the youth movement of Fratelli d’Italia, social media amplifying toxic discourse alongside rising pro-Russia sentiment, weakening media freedom and possible challenges which may bring especially the reforms of judiciary, strengthening of government’s competences and amendments to the electoral law. However, our interlocutor sees some hope. Institutional foundations of the Italian democracy withstand authoritarian pressures through their resilience. This opinion is confirmed by Italy’s scores in various indexes of democracy, media freedom and rule of law that show some erosion but definitely not the democratic backsliding.
For the third day of your visit we moved to Milan. When there we met with Antonio Campati, researcher in political philosophy at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Catholic University of the Sacret Heart and Valerio Alfonso Bruno, Fellow of the Centre for European Futures and Fellow of Far-Right Analysis Network. As our previous guests, they also mentioned the stability under Meloni’s rule. There are also no serious concerns about authoritarian slide. Meloni promotes a pragmatic approach to politics and distinguishes herself by personal charisma and political skills including the successful management of the ruling coalition. Doctor Campati underlined the word “fluidity” while describing a general nature of Italian policy, stating that political parties’ position in the system is often unsolid and fluctuating. Doctor Bruno stressed that Meloni’s domestic policy will depend to a large degree on the trajectory of the EU. The further rise of the radical right in the EU may contribute to Meloni’s radicalization.
Andrea Locatelli, professor at the Faculty of Foreign Languages at the University of Milan, underlines Meloni’s ability to align first with Biden and then with Trump while avoiding conflicts with the EU, alongside domestically waging more right-wing policies. The professor also diagnosed the axis of division among Italian political parties as their approach toward the Russian-Ukrainian war. Some of them acknowledge Russian interference, while others deny it, with Lega exploiting the war for political gain. The left is fragmented: the 5 Stelle Movement leans pro-Russia, whereas the Democratic Party (PD) supports Ukraine but opposes rearmament.
Lastly, we met with Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti, Senior research fellow at the Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia Centre at Italian Institute for International Political Studies. She focused on political parties’ approach to the war in Ukraine and how it changed over time. According to her, Matteo Salvini from Lega, reluctantly condemned the Russian full-scale invasion but gradually came back to a strong pro-Russian rhetoric. Giorgia Meloni, despite certain admiration of Vladimir Putin in the past, now vocally backs Ukraine while maintaining pragmatic flexibility regarding potential peace negotiations. The 5 Stelle Movement combines pacifist principles with opposition to Russian aggression but lacks coherent foreign policy direction. Ms Tafuro Ambrosetti also pointed out that Russian influence and disinformation campaigns target Italian political divisions over migration and EU integration.
The general conclusions from the visit can be summed up as Italy managed to maintain a relative stability. This approach benefits Italy both in Transatlantic and European relations. Experts are not concerned about democratic backsliding and rise of extreme forces in the society, although a soft “creeping” erosion of democratic system get recognition during the meetings.
Co-financed by the National Freedom Institute – Centre for Civil Society Development in the framework of the Civil Society Organisations Development Programme for 2018-2030 CSODev
