Fabio Turco is an Italian journalist based in Warsaw and correspondent for RSI (the Swiss public radio in Italian). He collaborates also with a number of Italian media groups.
Fratelli d’Italia and Lega have been governing Italy together since 2022. Although they are two parties that share a right-wing ideological vision, there are many differences between them. These become evident especially at the European level. At the moment, coexistence at the national stage is not in question, but the radical drift of Lega could put it at risk in the future.
Three years after taking office, the government led by Giorgia Meloni appears more stable than ever. The governing majority, composed of Fratelli d’Italia, Lega and Forza Italia seems cohesive and, to an outside observer, shows no particular problems on its path regarding the remaining two years of the legislature. Yet, looking more closely, this alliance reveals cracks that make it less solid than it might appear. The main cause of this is the rivalry between the two parties that occupy the far-right wing of the coalition: Fratelli d’Italia and Lega. Their competition is not so much on the domestic front as on the international one, particularly in the European Union. This is determined by two distinct perspectives on the role Italy should play in the EU and the world, together with their approach to major international issues, particularly the war in Ukraine. Forza Italia, the most moderate party (centre right) in the coalition, acts as a glue between them, trying to balance the demands of Lega, the radical far right, and Fratelli d’Italia, the majority party in government, which was born from the ashes of a post-fascist past and today seeks to maintain more softened positions.
Giorgia Meloni’s government is contrasted especially by the Democratic Party and left populist 5 Star Movement. The two parties are now seeking a convergence that will lead them into a future coalition, together with several small centre and left parties, to challenge the right camp in the 2027 elections. An alliance that, however, is still very far from being defined today.
The Italian political landscape is currently characterized by a certain multifaceted nature. While national politics is clearly dominated by the right, at the local level the issue becomes more nuanced. In general, the administrations of the most important cities (Rome, Milan, Turin and Naples) and a large part of the provincial capitals are in the hands of the centre left. Of the twenty Italian regions, thirteen are currently governed by the -right, six by the centre left.
The origin of the differences
Fratelli d’Italia was founded in 2012 on the initiative of Giorgia Meloni, Guido Crosetto (the current defence minister), and Ignazio La Russa (now President of the Senate). The party inherits the legacy of the Italian post-fascist right, of which La Russa was a historical militant in the ranks of the Italian Social Movement and then one of the leaders of Alleanza Nazionale.
The consensus regarding Fratelli d’Italia is determined by the fact that from its foundation until the day of its victory in the last political elections, it was always in opposition. This was a period for the country characterized by weak governments, tumultuous coalition changes, socio-economic problems, and unpopular political decisions, which all contributed to the rise in popularity of the more sovereigntist and radical parties. This climate of growing discontent led to a clear victory for Fratelli d’Italia in the 2022 elections. Even today, it can be said that this consistency is visible despite the more radical and controversial edges having been smoothed out on the altar of governability.
Lega, on the other hand, had a different path. Its recent history began in 2013, when Matteo Salvini took over the leadership of the party, changing its political line from a regionalist party to a national-populist party. After a period featuring a strong ascent that led the party to government in 2018 together with the 5 Star Movement, and reaching almost 35% of votes in the 2019 elections, a period of decline began when Salvini provoked a political crisis by pushing for snap elections. This did not happen. Instead, a coalition government was formed between the 5 Star Movement and the Democratic Party, with Salvini losing power. However, two years later, albeit reluctantly, Salvini supported Mario Draghi’s technocratic government. This was a choice that was punished by voters in the 2022 elections, when Lega obtained only 9% of the vote.
Therefore, despite a certain ideological closeness between Fratelli d’Italia and Lega, their different trajectories have also characterized their different power dynamics. Today, Fratelli d’Italia is undoubtedly the leading party of the Italian right (30% in opinion polls), while Lega competes for second place with Forza Italia (around 8%). Most probably these three parties will run together again in the 2027 parliamentary elections.
The European rivalry
Things change profoundly if we move to the European level, where the two parties belong to two different political families. Fratelli d’Italia is part of ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists), which aims for a decisive reversal of EU integration but does not contest the organization as such. Lega, on the other hand, is a member of Patriots for Europe, a group that adopts more radical Euroscepticism and does not exclude the exit of member states.
Naturally, there are points of convergence between ECR and Patriots for Europe. Both formations share the same scale of values, at the centre of which is the struggle for the preservation of the so-called traditional Christian family. This translates into more or less similar positions on issues related to ethics and civil rights, such as the rejection of euthanasia, the right to abortion, and same-sex unions. The same ideas on security regarding illegal immigration and a position contrary to the Green Deal policies are also shared. Finally, they share also attachment to a strong sovereign state and “native” national identity.
Opposite positions on Russia and Ukraine
However, a clear and deep rift separates the two political formations regarding their positioning on the war in Ukraine and relations with Russia. Fratelli d’Italia, consistent with the mainstream ECR line, adopted a pro-Atlantic stance of support for Kyiv from the first day of the conflict. Meloni unhesitatingly endorsed the Western sanctions against Russia, and under her government, Italy participated in military and logistical support for Ukraine.
Lega, on the other hand, is a party that has had close connections with United Russia, Putin’s party, for years. In 2017, the two parties signed a cooperation agreement, which stipulated that they would consult each other and exchange “information on current issues, international relations, and the exchange of experiences in the sphere of youth policies and economic development”. The agreement was later repudiated by Lega following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but the ideological proximity remains. Salvini aligns himself with Viktor Orbán’s “pacifist” line, according to which military support for Ukraine prolongs the war. On several occasions, he has criticized Western sanctions against Moscow, albeit more softly than the Hungarian prime minister.
Lega’s position is nevertheless in the minority within the governing coalition, where Forza Italia maintains positions very similar to Fratelli d’Italia on the Ukrainian issue. The party founded by Silvio Berlusconi in 1994 and headed by him until his death in 2023 has always maintained an Atlanticist line. On the other hand, Berlusconi was a personal friend of Vladimir Putin and had even justified his positions after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, the current leader, Antonio Tajani, former president of the European Parliament from 2017 to 2019, aligned the party’s foreign policy with the European Commission’s line.
Different policies in the EU
The different power dynamics reflect the different attitudes of the two Italian leaders and their different ambitions in the EU. In recent years, Meloni has managed to build a particular relationship with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Despite differences and initial mutual distrust, Meloni understood that at a certain point in the last legislature, the Commission needed support from its party. At the same time, by abstaining from the vote of confidence for the second mandate, the Italian leader managed to create distance in the eyes of her own voters. This balancing act could also possibly reflect Meloni’s future ambitions in Europe.
Matteo Salvini, on the contrary, does not have the strength, and probably not even the will, to cultivate ambitions of a certain level on the European stage. In general, the Lega leader’s strategy seems to be more aimed at moving the party to increasingly radical positions, as observed by Leonardo Bianchi, a journalist and writer who has written several books on the far right in Italy and beyond. “Salvini is not only adopting increasingly radical and extreme positions, but he is trying to outflank the far right on the right, mimicking the policies and rhetoric of the MAGA world. From the relaunch of racist slogans like ‘Remigration’, on which Meloni has never expressed herself, to the massive adoption of artificial intelligence in social posts, in propaganda, up to a whole series of alliances with movements and figures of European neo-fascism and neo-Nazism, from which Fratelli d’Italia, on the other hand, has distanced itself in an attempt to clean up its institutional credibility.”
A different role in European families
Fratelli d’Italia and Lega also play two different roles within their respective political families. Within ECR, Giorgia Meloni’s party holds a leading role alongside the Polish Law and Justice (PiS). After five years of leadership, Meloni handed over the group’s presidency to former Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki at the beginning of 2025. Fratelli d’Italia shares a political line with PiS, which overall enjoys a good convergence of ideas. Moreover, PiS appreciates that relations between Meloni and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, the party’s archenemy, are almost non-existent.
Conversely, a cause for concern could be the relationship that is developing between the Italian Prime Minister and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. “PiS, a party that in recent years has made the anti-German campaign one of its bastions, might not be particularly happy with this opening,” observes Teresa Coratella, Policy Fellow at the Rome office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). In the past there were even talks of a possible move by Meloni to the EPP (European People’s Party). At the moment, such an option does not seem to be on the agenda, but if the conservatives were to shift their centre of gravity to the right, the issue of Fratelli d’Italia’s transfer to the EPP may return to the political agenda.
Lega is in a different position, overshadowed by the preponderance of Fidesz and Rassemblement National within Patriots. “Salvini’s role is truly secondary,” says Coratella. “His only strategy is to follow the predominant leaders within the group, Le Pen and Orbán, and above all to try to be as much as possible a megaphone for Trump in Brussels.”
Following Trump, towards the future
Another point of friction between the two leaders of the Italian right is their relationship with Donald Trump. Meloni was the only European leader invited to the inauguration ceremony of his presidency. The excellent relationship placed her in a privileged position to act as an intermediary when relations between the European Union and the United States began to become more tense due to US reversals on the war in Ukraine and the issue of tariffs. However, the tariffs represented a small turning point. Meloni did not show particular enthusiasm for the American president’s conduct, marking a slight cooling in relations – which nevertheless remain very good. In this context, the Lega tried to intervene in favour of the US, without success, and the move was certainly not appreciated by Meloni’s entourage.
In light of this picture, the prime minister maintains strong Atlantic ties and European anchoring, but towards 2027, this line could come into conflict with the radical drift of Lega, where the former armed forces General Roberto Vannacci, the party’s vice-president, MEP and author of the bestseller Il mondo al contrario, a sort of fascist manifesto, seems ready to eclipse Salvini. Vannacci’s push risks destabilizing the coalition. Forza Italia, which does not appreciate radical demands and can still count on the media empire of the Berlusconi family, probably will attempt to once again mediate between the far-right parties. However, the radicalisation of Lega may make these efforts almost “mission impossible”.
Edited by Adam Balcer
