Vit Dostal, executive director at the Association for International Affairs (AMO), a Prague-based foreign policy think tank
The Czech elections in October signaled no radical shift to the far right. However, the elections point to several trends that need to be noted in Czech society. Although Andrej Babiš’s party will play the role of a relatively moderate part of the cabinet, it will face pressure from extremists in the government.
Andrej Babiš and his populist catch-all movement ANO (YES), which belongs to the European political far-right group “Patriots of Europe”, won the Czech parliamentary elections held on October 3rd and 4th. ANO received almost 35% of the vote, which was enough to secure 80 seats in the 200-member chamber. It is now forming a government with the radical-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) and the anti-green MAGA-style Motorists for Themselves party. This alliance might bring consequences in terms of the rule of law in Czechia and wider Europe.
The election results showed that Czechs do not want extremes. According to previous polls, extremists were expected to do very well in the elections. The SPD, Motorists, and the radical nationalist left-wing group Stačilo! (Enough!), which has incorporated various pro-Russian and disinformation currents, as well as the Social Democrats, were expected to win up to 45 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. They won just 28. On the contrary, the more moderate ANO achieved a better result.
ANO – relatively moderate.
First, Andrej Babiš and his ANO party did not resort to extremist rhetoric during the campaign. The dominant themes were criticism of Petr Fiala’s government’s economic policy (inflation, energy prices) and social issues (pension policy). Babiš repeatedly stated that he would not allow any referendum on leaving the European Union and NATO. He was aware that many voters were deciding between ANO and more radical parties and tried to win over his potential electorate by claiming that ANO had experience in government, that voters knew them, and that they had fared better during his time in office. This strategy was apparently successful, as ANO gained strength at the expense of both SPD and Stačilo! The second notable factor was the increase in voter turnout, which was higher in the peripheral regions of the Czech Republic, where ANO clearly won. The developments of the last four years have thus mobilized even otherwise apathetic voters to express their views on the country’s political development. Sociological data show that up to 55% of Czechs believe that the situation in the Czech Republic is generally developing in the wrong direction. These are the highest figures since this measurement began in the 1990s. It was the more centrist ANO, not the extremists, that took advantage of the general frustration in society.
The division in society is not fundamentally different from the 2021 elections. At that time, however, approximately 1 million mostly protest votes were lost because these parties did not reach the 5% threshold. The only thing that shook up the results in this year’s elections was that the nationalist left Stačilo! did not make it into the Chamber of Deputies with around 4% of the vote.
The new government: not so moderate as it seems…
Voters expect Andrej Babiš to “put things in order” and do not want radical steps such as leaving the EU or NATO. This does not mean that Babiš’s supporters are strong advocates of Czech membership in these organizations. Rather, they do not see the addressing of these issues, among other pressing ones, as essential. However, given the shape of the government that is taking form, with Babiš deciding to cooperate with Motorists for Themselves and the SPD, this result does not mean that extreme positions in domestic and foreign policy are out of the question. Quite the contrary.
All parties in the newly formed parliamentary majority make no secret of their critical view of public media. Over the past four years, there has been an increase in license fees, which finance these media institutions in Czechia, as well as an expansion of the number of people who are required to pay them. This has been met with criticism, particularly from the SPD and ANO, and Babiš has openly spoken out in favor of merging Czech Television and Czech Radio and nationalizing them, which would make them more easily influenced by the ruling elite.
Another topic is the attitude towards NGOs. Here again, all three parties make no secret of their desire to limit the activities of NGOs, which, according to these parties, “interfere disproportionately in politics” or influence educational institutions. The minimum requirement for the new government coalition will be to strengthen oversight of foreign funding, with the maximum being an end to any government cooperation with NGOs.
In both cases, ANO would face resistance from civil society. Non-governmental organizations would be able to mobilize, and a huge part of society, given the historical legacy of the independence of public radio and television, would not tolerate their subjugation. Such steps would also attract the attention of European institutions, either because of a possible violation of the European Media Freedom Act or a threat to Article 7.
Checks and balances
It should be emphasized that the new parliamentary majority cannot make any significant changes to the judiciary or the constitutional order. They do not have a constitutional majority in the lower house. In the upper house – the Senate – they are in a minority position. Moreover, Senate elections are held in such a way that one-third of the Senate is replaced every two years. ANO and extreme parties have historically not been very successful in these elections, as mainstream parties tend to win. President Petr Pavel, who is actively participating in negotiations on the upcoming government, stands guard over constitutionality and the boundaries of what is permissible. Pavel will definitely play the role of opponent to the government if it veers toward extreme measures. The Constitutional Court, which is appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate, would also oppose any fundamental changes to the political system.
European dimension
The domestic policy of the new government and its actions will have an impact on European and foreign policy, and vice versa. Certain measures taken against civil society and public media will provoke a European response and pressure on the government in Prague. They will also limit Babiš’s ability to build coalitions at the European level with parties other than those on the far right, which will be important, particularly on issues such as climate policy, energy, migration, and the long-term European budget. As a result, active pressure on Babiš from mainstream European leaders may be effective in preventing him from taking the most radical actions or getting stuck in toxic alliances.
However, we can safely expect the new Czech government to be even more anti-climate and anti-green. The resistance will focus on ETS2 and the ban on the production of combustion engines. In this regard, the government will want to deliver something to its supporters on issues that have become a bogeyman for the Czech population. Similarly, following the example of Hungary, Slovakia and even Poland, we can expect the new government to reject the implementation of the migration pact. None of the parties in the newly forming majority have made any secret of this goal.
Ukraine
As far as Babiš’s security policy and stance towards Ukraine are concerned, Babiš’s government has a number of options on the table. It could refuse to increase defense spending and maintain military and humanitarian support for Ukraine, as well as Czech commitments concerning the Eastern Flank of NATO. Prague could even join Hungary in blocking the opening of accession talks with Kyiv or the introduction of new sanctions against Russia. Last but not least, the status and support of Ukrainian refugees in Czechia is also at stake.
The SPD will likely want to make its mark on some of these issues by pushing them to extremes. On the other hand, Babiš will find it difficult to accept steps that would damage his international reputation. He would also gain very little by exercising his veto because, unlike Orbán, for example, he has no interests in this area. However, Ukrainian refugees are likely to be the victims of the SPD’s participation in the government. The outgoing government set very strict conditions for obtaining permanent residence for Ukrainians.
Not the end of the world, but…
In conclusion, it can be said that the new Czech government does not pose an immediate threat to the rule of law, nor does it have any deliberate intention to act radically at the European level. Andrej Babiš does not have his own strong ideological agenda. He is a transactional politician of a populist style who is likely to avoid complete extremes. He will also be moderated by domestic pressure from civil society, the upper house of parliament, the president, and the independent constitutional court, as well as mainstream European partners. On the other hand, his coalition partners, especially the SPD, will push him into more radical positions.
In that case, Czechia will be in a permanent state of conflict, with the president, civil society, and opposition parties on one side and the government on the other. The struggle will be over the independence of public media; the position of part of the non-governmental sector; and security, foreign and European policy. An unstable government will likely be torn apart by disputes, with Babiš himself not wanting to be labeled as radical but needing to maintain a government majority.
Edited by Adam Balcer
