Andrei Macsut
After the May 2025 presidential elections, Romania has entered a reform window – but time is limited. The root causes of the strength of the far right remain unaddressed. Success or failure will hinge on governing discipline and coalition strategy.
For the second time in Romanian history, two ‘outsiders’ met in the second round of the presidential elections (the first time being in the winter of 2024). Both Nicușor Dan, an independent, and George Simion, the far-right leader of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), were seen as “anti-system” candidates. This is a factor that likely contributed to Dan’s eventual victory, as the then-mayor of Bucharest managed to position himself as a unifier, arguing that the benefits of development and EU membership should reach all Romanians, leaving nobody behind. Dan’s promise and background of mathematical brilliance and civic activism contrasted with Simion, whose campaign was rooted in anger at the establishment and promises of revenge.
“We bought three years,” Dan stated shortly after his win, aware that it was not a moment of triumph, but a window – a limited, fragile window – for meaningful reform. George Simion captured an astonishing 46% of the vote in the second round, a sign that the deep public dissatisfaction with corruption, inequality and political inertia finally had reached its boiling point.
Romania has been here before. Since joining the European Union in 2007, the country has oscillated between waves of technocratic optimism and cycles of captured governance. European integration brought major benefits – but not for all. While parts of urban Romania flourished, some areas of the country have lagged behind. The resulting inequality, compounded by a creaking judiciary, chronic underfunding of public services, and persistent patronage politics, combined with arrogance on the part of the establishment, has created fertile ground for populist narratives.
Governing Under Constraint
The immense challenge facing Nicușor Dan is uniting a fragmented political class, which has often been concerned with preserving its own privileges and securing a government stable and strong enough to enact meaningful change. As a result, the question is not whether reform is needed – but whether it is still politically possible. Early signs are optimistic, as Dan nominated Ilie Bolojan (National liberal Party – PNL) for prime minister. This followed a month of negotiations with the major pro-European political parties in Romania. Bolojan, known as a reformer who is not afraid to take unpopular decisions, faces immense challenges, as Romania must reduce a deficit of 9.3%, the highest in the European Union, without strengthening support for an already menacing extremist current. Bolojan has outlined three core priorities: “putting the country’s finances in order, work for good governance that leads to development, and showing Romanians due respect”.
The Social Democratic Party (PSD) remains the largest parliamentary force and is the gatekeeper to any functioning majority. Yet the PSD’s long legacy of clientelism, resistance to justice reform, and dependence on local patronage networks makes it an unreliable partner for deep structural change. President Dan stated he would like the party to be part of the next government, and negotiations thus far seem to indicate that, despite pressure from its own younger reformist wing, the party is still focused on preserving its own clientelist networks of influence. Evidence of this could be seen during negotiations between the PSD and Dan on joining the new government when fiscal policies represented a major point of contention.
In the most optimistic scenario, the PSD could strike a pragmatic bargain by allowing some reforms to pass while shaping them enough to protect their local interests. In the worst case, they could stall or block key initiatives and blame Dan’s government for dysfunction, preparing the ground for a populist return in 2028.
The Urgency Of Now
The 2025 presidential elections were fought between competing currents of thought. The establishment parties believed the system should be left alone (with them at the helm), as only they knew how to properly run it and govern. At the same time, Dan and several reformists believed the system is broken and must be repaired, while Simion and the national conservatives believed the system is broken and must be destroyed. In this sense, the elections were not just about choosing a president, they were a referendum on whether the system can still fix itself.
The four core challenges facing Bolojan and Dan are national in scope and deeply entrenched. Romania’s structural deficit risks triggering international backlash, as the country is close to receiving a “junk rating”, as well as losing access to vital EU recovery funds. The new government is expected to conduct a comprehensive audit of central and local government spending. This is complemented by a restructuring of public sector wages, the downsizing of public institutions, administrative and territorial reform, and a reduction in subsidies and clientelist transfers not tied to performance. There is also talk of reducing tax evasion, especially through VAT, and improving tax collection. While all of these measures are necessary, much of the post-electoral public agenda was focused on potential tax increases, which are seen as inevitable in the near future. How the tax burden will be distributed (whether focusing on the well-off through progressive and property taxes, or the poor and middle class through VAT or income tax hikes) will likely shape the government’s legitimacy for the remainder of their mandate. The first measures taken by the Bolojan cabinet included cutting scholarships for students, increasing VAT from 19% to 21%. The latter was complemented by an increase from 5% and 9% to 11% for products where the reduced VAT applied (including food, books, firewood and other essentials). However, voters expect austerity measures to target political and economic elites more than the middle and lower classes, and Bolojan promised to make cuts to the benefits of political parties and their clientele too. These include capping bonuses, reducing subsidies for political parties, privatizing or dismantling unprofitable public companies, and removing exceptions that allowed magistrates to retire after 25 years of service irrespective of age.
Endemic corruption, particularly in local governance and public procurement, is the second major challenge, which continues to erode trust and waste EU and state funds. Justice and the struggle for integrity was a cornerstone of Nicușor Dan’s campaign, and the first major hurdle will be the Minister of Justice, as they will appoint the General Prosecutor. Who this person is will indicate how serious the effort to limit corruption will be taken.
Infrastructure gaps, education disparities, and poor healthcare access in the countryside and small towns make regional disparities striking. While urban centers are at or above the European average across many standard living indicators, rural and post-industrial areas have been left far behind. Reducing these inequalities will be the third major challenge.
Romanian public administration remains heavily politicized, under-resourced, and structurally weak. The public sector faces the simultaneous challenge of being both understaffed and expensive to run because there are too many leadership roles. These handsomely paid positions are often reserved for political clients, leaving too few resources and people to actually deliver public services. Reorganizing, de-politicizing, and improving the quality of public services and administration is the fourth major challenge.
The next three years will likely define the future of Romanian democracy. Either this government delivers reforms that restore institutional credibility and economic fairness, or it paves the way for a far-right resurgence that will be harder, if not impossible, to stop.
The Far Right After The Vote
George Simion’s 46% in the second round of the presidential elections signals not a temporary surge, but a structural presence of far-right nationalist sentiment within Romania. The far right offered scapegoats instead of solutions to existing problems, implying that simply getting rid of certain people or groups (the Șoroș “network”, globalists, “anti-national elites”, “the system”, NGOs, etc.) would make things better. After his narrow defeat, Simion downplayed his extremist rhetoric, portraying himself as a “responsible nationalist” rather than a radical outsider. He pivoted from calling for violence to emphasizing democratic rhetoric, describing himself as a defender of the constitutional order and collective “freedom”, while also reframing AUR as “Euro-realist”, stressing commitment to the single market while cautioning about allegedly unchecked EU federalism. His tone on Ukraine also shifted, emphasizing safeguarding national security through strong NATO ties rather than directly opposing military aid. In this, he is establishing himself as a mainstream political figure, looking to attract a wider pool of supporters by learning from mistakes and adapting to context.
However, at the same time, Simion continues to present the annulled presidential election of 2024, and the official investigation into foreign interference, as a “betrayal by the establishment”. He has called on supporters to “light candles for democracy” in mass protests, which have thus far not occurred. He has framed the current government as illegitimate, arguing that voters who backed him are facing a “coup d’état” – fueling ongoing narratives of fraud and civic disenfranchisement. Finally, Russian sources continue to amplify the anti-establishment and anti-Ukraine narratives in AUR’s discourse, but with no strong evidence of coordination.
Ideological Divide
The far right is not monolithic. Parties like S.O.S. Romania and POT may fracture AUR’s base or, conversely, intensify nationalist messaging. The potential for competitive radicalization is there. Already, S.O.S. Romania’s leader, Diana Șoșoacă, strongly attacked Simion during the campaign and vice versa. While some POT members of parliament resigned, some defected to the PSD. The biggest surprise came with Claudiu Târziu’s resignation from AUR. He was one of the founding members of the party and its chief ideologue, claiming Simion behaved like a dictator as his reason for leaving. Târziu then announced his own political party, Conservative Action, which has been founded alongside other former AUR members. In July, AUR initiated a motion of censorship against the Bolojan government but faced difficulty gathering enough support to trigger a vote of no confidence, as even members of other nationalist parties were reluctant to join. On July 14th, the vote of no confidence finally occurred, tallying only 134 votes in favor and 4 abstentions, falling significantly short of the 233 votes needed to pass. Most of the 398 MPs present did not cast their ballot.
AUR was recently integrated into the European Conservatives and Reformists group. This has only encouraged Simion’s engagement with figures like the Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni, the new Polish President Karol Nawrocki, and even Warsaw’s former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. This signifies a coordinated, transnational far-right movement – one that transcends domestic politics. However, the maintenance of solidarity among nationalists is difficult. The Hungarian minority in Romania (usually hardcore supporters of Victor Orban) voted overwhelmingly for Nicușor Dan, forcing Orban to withdraw an initial endorsement of Simion. In July, AUR also tried to initiate a motion against the EU Commissioner Ursula von der Leyen and was ridiculed for this even by Georgia Meloni.
There is currently a consensus among pro-European Romanian parties that associating with AUR and Simion is not the best course of action. Yet, applying a ‘cordon sanitaire’ requires deep structural reforms to be effective, which would reduce far-right support. Without this, governing parties will continue to lose backing and legitimacy, making future elections harder to win. This could open up the way for a far-right government, with all of the democratic backsliding that typically follows.
The last chance?
The parties governing Romania face formidable obstacles, starting with a reliance on the PSD and a fractured, transactional parliament. At the same time, the far right is down, but not out. AUR and Simion remain powerful political actors, buoyed by a large digital following and deep reservoirs of public distrust. Their future, whether toward moderation or radicalization, will depend heavily on the reformers’ performance in the years ahead. A monthly poll conducted by INSCOP found 40% support for AUR, while public backing for POT and SOS collapsed. Surprisingly, this is also true regarding the PSD, whose support fell to 13%, behind PNL and only just above USR. This is a sign that PSD voters were increasingly migrating to AUR. If this trend continues, it is possible that the next government will be far right, irrespective of the measures taken to reduce the deficit.
The lesson of the past elections is that if this opportunity for reform is squandered, it may be the last one. Cynically, it is also possible that the measures taken by the current government will work and leave behind a stronger economy. However, the moves necessary for this might be so unpopular that the far right will reap the benefits. Seeing how far-right candidates behave in office in other countries, and their assault on democratic institutions, the rule of law, and the separation of power, a far-right government, especially one with a strong economy, might pose an existential challenge to Romania’s already shaky democracy.
Andrei Macsut is a public integrity expert and senior researcher for the Romanian Academic Society.
The article was edited by Adam Balcer.
