Kristina Tsabala
Bulgaria can probably be described as the weakest link within the EU, where the corrupt environment and clientelist networks allow for the deep penetration of pro-Russian actors. This infiltration into Bulgarian domestic affairs undermines democratic institutions and compromises the integrity of security operations. It also affects the operation of the European internal market and normalizes anti-democratic political discourse.
At the beginning of 2025 Bulgaria is heading for its eighth consecutive snap election since April 2021. The lack of government and political leadership is only exacerbating the public dissatisfaction and polarization that underpin the hold of Russian soft power. The political crisis amplifies the uncertainty regarding the geopolitical leanings of the administration, which creates broader opportunities for leveraging Russian interests. Today, pro-Russian attitudes are typical not only among the supporters of the far right but also to a lesser degree those on the left and even those at the center of the political spectrum.
In order to wield influence in Bulgaria, the Kremlin exploits an environment of democratic backsliding, governance deficits and the erosion of civil liberties, which have all kept the country locked in political polarization and strategic ambiguity. Since 2014, the Kremlin has started to reap the fruits of its disinformation operations amidst the public disillusionment with the existing leadership, which allows for pro-Russian political actors to gain traction. While trust in institutions is decreasing, belief in misinformation narratives is taking hold.
Slavdom, Orthodox Christianity and… communism
Russia leverages the affinity present among a significant part of Bulgaria society around historical ties (Russians as liberators from the “Turkish yoke”); post-communist nostalgia based on the historically large popularity of the communist party in the 20th century; and cultural affinity (Slavic identity and the Cyrillic alphabet) especially through the Orthodox Church. Even though Bulgaria’s Patriarchate is separate from its Russian counterpart, it does remain a key channel for Russian cultural influence and the promotion of ideas revolving around the Russian world. Nevertheless, over the last five years, the attitude of Bulgarians towards Russia has deteriorated considerably against the backdrop of geopolitical events. This is especially true regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As of March 2024, 20% of Bulgarians approve of Vladimir Putin, marking a significant decline after the invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, it is still one of the highest approval rates among the EU. In a poll conducted by Gallup in August-September 2024, 52% of Bulgarians surveyed expressed a lack of trust of Russia. This is in comparison to only 30% who did not trust Russia in 2021. However, at the same time, in August 2024, a study of Global Analytics showed that 56% of Bulgarians do not consider Russia a threat to Bulgaria. Almost a half of surveyed Bulgarians (46%) also think that the reason for the start of the war in Ukraine is provocation by the US and NATO.
State capture through strategic asset control
The Kremlin’s networks of influence in Bulgaria use ties in the regional oligarchic network to take advantage of weak states’ institutional frailty and existing state capture. They promote rent-seeking and criminal behavior. As Russia remains the largest supplier of oil and gas in Bulgaria, the Kremlin has weaponized this energy dependence to exert considerable influence within domestic affairs. The oil giant Lukoil holds a near-monopoly in Bulgaria, dominating all aspects of crude oil imports, processing, storage, transportation and fuel supply. Its primary oil port at Rosenets operates as a “Russian enclave”, as it is private property free from any oversight from the Bulgarian authorities. The company provides fuel for essential services, including the military and police, and controls over 95% of tax warehouses indirectly, reinforcing its influence in the market. With an estimated profit of 1 billion EUR annually, this revenue likely supports Russia’s war efforts. For years, Lukoil avoided paying taxes in Bulgaria due to a legal loophole. Notably, Bulgarian politicians have tended to avoid addressing the company’s influence and operations, underscoring its sensitive and entrenched position.
The Kremlin’s ability to evade sanctions through loopholes in Bulgaria was further highlighted through Lukoil’s success in winning a derogation in Bulgaria from the EU and G7’s oil embargo. Through continuing to process Russian oil in the refinery it owns in Burgas, the Russian oil company provided around 1 billion USD for Putin’s coffers from the start of the war in Ukraine to January 2024. Lukoil, on the other hand, has used EU ports and key hubs in international waters (Kalamata Lighthouse, Malta and Ceuta, among others) for ship-to-ship transfers and onward exports to non-EU countries, after leaving Bulgarian ports.
The Black Sea coast is also marked by large-scale investments in real estate by Russians. A striking example is the 300 acres of land owned by the municipality of Moscow and a sanatorium and health resort called “Kamchiya” 30 kilometers from Varna. Even though the purchase of Bulgarian land by a foreign state is illegal, the deal was made between the Bulgarian state and a company registered in Bulgaria with the ultimate beneficiary being the municipality of Moscow. This thereby uses a constitutional loophole that allows for effective impunity. Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev in 2008 signed the building permits for the resort and in 2009 Prime Minister Boyko Borissov and the Mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov cut the ribbon at the opening of the resort. In 2019, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that the resort will be used to spread Moscow’s influence in Europe.
Exploiting governance deficits
By targeting countries such as Bulgaria with weak institutions, low transparency and high corruption, Russia creates opportunities for illicit financial flows and exerts undue influence. In such environments, the rule of law often erodes, with policies becoming skewed to favor malign actors.
The politicization of crucial institutions concerning Bulgaria’s internal security has resulted in the inability to effectively respond to serious incidents and threats from Russia. The Prosecutor’s Office in Bulgaria has failed to investigate numerous cases of Kremlin-linked explosions in Bulgaria’s arms production facilities, as well as the Magnitsky-sanctioned Nikolay Malinov for Russian espionage activities. Malinov was a member of parliament from the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and now leads the pro-Russian lobby group called the “Russophiles National Movement”, which has used the Kamchiya resort for hosting events. The state’s counter-intelligence agency (SANS) appeared unable to respond to the attempted poisoning of one of Bulgaria’s biggest arms dealers and a series of attacks on military facilities. Lately, it has also not been able to respond to Russian efforts to recruit Bulgarians for their war efforts. As the enforcement of anti-corruption policy is ultimately dependent on the effectiveness of the Bulgarian prosecution and SANS, the politicization of these institutions represents a significant vulnerability in Bulgaria’s national security.
Cultivating political alliances
Bulgaria has a track record when it comes to the representation of Russian interests in the national assembly. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the successor to the Bulgarian Communist Party, continues to follow the Kremlin’s guidelines and promote its narratives. In addition to expressing a stiff opposition to assisting Ukraine in the war against Russia and promoting candidates that have publicly supported Moscow’s claim to Crimea (such as Vanya Grigorova during the electoral campaign for the Sofia municipal elections), BSP members staunchly supported the anti-LGBT propaganda act in August 2024. Some party members also form part of the Russophiles National Movement in Bulgaria. However, BSP’s popularity has considerably weakened in recent years. It won only 8% in the elections of October 2024.
On the other hand, the president of the country, Rumen Radev, was endorsed by the BSP and is popular among the public. He is also a pro-Russian actor in Bulgarian politics. During his second term, which coincided with the political crisis in Bulgaria, his duty was to appoint ministers while the members of parliament could not form a government. It was not only his pro-Russian rhetoric but also his appointments that had a significant policy impact in the country. For example, he chose Stefan Yanev as defense minister in spite of the fact that he called the war in Ukraine a “special military operation”. His choice in energy ministers has led to the import of Russian gas even though it was banned by the previous government led by “Continuing the Change”.
But the list of pro-Russian political groups in Bulgaria does not end with BSP. Far-right parties also have even clearer direct ties with Russia. The Ataka party had previously provided a useful example when it came to illustrating how the Kremlin employs illicit financial flows to support extreme politics in the region to gain allies in critical political positions. More recently, the Revival party, which won 13% in October 2024, has provided the Kremlin with an opportunity to wield influence in the Bulgarian national assembly. It has advocated for closer ties with Russia; pressed for a referendum on a Bulgarian withdrawal from NATO; and promoted the expansion of Lukoil’s control of the Bulgarian energy sector. The party’s chairman, Kostadin Kostadinov – himself a former member of Ataka – has long been accused of benefiting from close ties and financial support from the Kremlin. The party, which holds 37 seats in parliament, sent a delegation of MPs to Moscow in February 2024 after invitations from Putin’s United Russia party. Smaller radical parties such as Greatness and Sword, which won a combined 8% of votes in the most recent elections, also represent such attitudes and are known to collaborate with Russian actors. Of course, they have also used the resort of Kamchiya.
Media manipulation and disinformation
Bulgaria has a high prevalence of pro-Kremlin and pro-Russian disinformation sources in comparison to its size. This effectively makes it Russia’s “Trojan horse” in the EU that has helped to normalize these narratives within European politics. Even though Russian outlets such as RT are banned, numerous online publications replicate and repost Russian-sponsored media content. The harmful effect is amplified through the traditional media outlets, which use this content as it provokes interest and emotional reactions among the Bulgarian public.
A recent study by the Center for the Study of Democracy shows that disinformation regarding Ukrainian migrants and refugees in Bulgaria has been amplified on social media mostly through Facebook pages that explicitly support Putin, Russia and a close relationship between Bulgaria and Russia.
Russophiles and Russian-speaking Bulgarians, as a consequence of their staunch support for Russia, often discriminate and abuse Ukrainians who reside in Bulgaria. The coastal region is marked by its considerable support for Russia and pro-Russian parties (Revival and Ataka originated in Varna), as well as its many cases of abuse and violence to Ukrainian citizens.
Conclusion
Bulgaria is severely destabilized by Russian influence, which abuses the challenges faced by the country as it attempts to move towards a solidified democracy. The Kremlin encourages polarization that undermines support for democratic institutions and values. This naturally causes an increase in support for pro-Russian and/or radical anti-democratic politicians.
The crucial challenge faced by Bulgaria’s democracy relates to the fact that officials and entrepreneurs in certain sectors, such as media and energy, do not perceive Russia as a threat. Critical security institutions remain hotbeds of pro-Russian sympathies and as a result no serious actions have been taken to curb Russia’s corrosive influence in Bulgaria’s society, economy and political life. In addition to illegal trade and financial operations, there is also a spill-over effect that is affecting social attitudes towards the European Union and NATO. These institutions are the anchors of Bulgarian democracy. Citizens are judging these organizations more and more negatively according to the behavior of Bulgarian political actors. Politicians on a large scale are abusing their powers and re-enforcing cycles of kleptocratic practice, effectively favoring foreign corrupt actors such as the Kremlin.
Kristina Tsabala is a researcher from Bulgaria and an Associate Political Expert for the civic education organization Active Politics. She has worked previously as an Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law Analyst at the Center for the Study of Democracy.
Edited by Adam Balcer
