Guillem Ripoll is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Economics and Business at the University of Navarra in Pamplona (Spain)
The political landscape in Spain has entered a new and contentious post-election phase in recent months. Indeed, the country is grappling with a rising tide of political turmoil and persistent polarization.
2024 has brought an array of complex and divisive issues to the forefront in Spain. Regional and European election results have sharpened political fault lines, while a cascade of integrity scandals has placed the Spanish government under intense scrutiny. These scandals have undermined trust in institutions at a time when Spain is also confronting economic instability, growing migration pressures, and broader international challenges. The deepening and structural polarization of the Spanish political scene remains a key challenge to democracy and internal stability.
Autonomic elections in Galicia and Catalonia: A mixed picture
Two major regional elections took place in Spain in 2024. Elections were held in Galicia (February) and Catalonia (May), two regions with their own distinct cultures and languages. Indeed, they are sometimes considered as two specific nations within Spain. Regardless of these similarities, both regions are remarkedly different. While Catalonia has historically been more industrialized, wealthier and nationalist with a strong left-leaning tradition, Galicia has generally been more rural, conservative and less economically developed. However, political and economic dynamics in both regions are complex, with ongoing shifts and internal variations.
The People’s Party (PP), a centre right group, despite a slight drop in support, retained its absolute majority in Galicia. The Socialist Party (PSOE) faced a significant setback, losing 5% of its vote share, while the left-nationalist BNG gained 8%, attracting more than 30% of the vote and consequently achieving the best result in its history. However, BNG was unable to challenge the PP’s hold on power. Voter turnout was 67%, an 8% increase from the previous election in 2020. This increase in participation and the results are a function of the contestation of the national government (by PSOE-Sumar and its nationalist allies), regional identity dynamics and the strong mobilization strategies by all political parties.
In contrast, the Catalan elections marked significant change. Participation dropped to 58%, 6 points below average and 20 points lower than the record turnout in 2017. For the first time in 15 years, a tripartite pact (a coalition of PSOE, the left-nationalist ERC, and the green left) formed a government. Despite the ERC and Comuns losing ground, PSOE’s gains enabled this left-leaning majority, partially reversing the dominance of pro-independence parties. The PP increased its vote share by 8% while VOX retained its previous seats. At the same time, Aliança Catalana, a far-right Catalan nationalist party, entered the regional parliament with nearly 4% of the vote.
Catalan nationalism is not as salient as it was 10 years ago. The nationalist cause seems to no longer have its ability to mobilize large groups of people, and its polarization potential has also reduced. The aftermath of nationalism in Catalonia seems to have seen an embrace of the policies adopted by the PSOE at the head of the Spanish government. Finally, migration and security problems were two topics exploited by the extreme (and nationalist) right in Catalonia. Without being that much of a surprise, these voices reached a small, albeit substantial, share of Catalan voters.
European elections: protest and punishment
It is usually said that European elections (June) are ‘second order’ elections, secondary to national elections and fought primarily on domestic issues. This usually has three main implications: lower turnout compared to national elections; political campaigns organized around national parties and national cleavages; and voters more likely to apply either the ‘punishment’ or ‘protest’ thesis in their electoral choices. The results of the European elections in Spain in 2024 almost perfectly fit these general trends. First, voter participation was slightly below 50%, around 11 percentage points lower than in 2019. While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons for this decline, several factors likely contributed. The key factor is that the European elections did not coincide with the regional and municipal elections, which may have reduced the overall voter turnout. Additionally, there is a growing sense of citizen disaffection and distrust in politics, with many voters feeling increasingly disconnected from political institutions and sceptical of their impact. Furthermore, the perceived utility of what happens at the European level may have been low, leading some voters to skip the elections altogether, especially if they believed the outcomes would not significantly affect their daily lives.
In terms of the key results, the People’s Party (PP) won 22 seats with 34% of the vote, marking a significant increase compared to the previous election. VOX, the far-right party, gained almost 10% of the vote, increasing its seats from 4 to 6. In contrast, the Socialist Party (PSOE) lost 1 seat, with its vote share falling from 33% to 30%. The Left coalition (far left) suffered an even more severe decline, losing half of its seats, dropping from 6 to 3. Another noteworthy outcome was the emergence of a new far-right party called ‘Se Acabó La Fiesta’ (SALF), which secured almost 5% of the vote and 3 seats.
Several factors help explain these results. First, opposition parties framed the campaign as a referendum on the national government’s policies, leveraging dissatisfaction with the current leadership. The success of the PP and the losses suffered by the governing parties align with the ‘punishment’ thesis, which suggests that voters often use European elections to penalize incumbent governments, either through abstention or by voting for opposition parties. Interestingly, current national polls (October, 35-37%) indicate that the PP would likely win if national elections were held with an even better result than in 2023, reinforcing this pattern.
Second, a “decent” performance for VOX and the entry of SALF can be understood through the ‘protest’ thesis. This theory posits that European elections provide an outlet for voters to express discontent, either with the EU or with the political system more broadly. In current opinion polls (October), VOX maintains a stable popularity (above 10%), while SALF partly lost its appeal, enjoying today the support of around 2-3% of voters. On the other hand, in response to the rise of the far right, nationalist and regional parties also improved slightly their standings in polls in comparison to the last elections (from 27 seats to around 30). This might make the left even more dependent on the support of Catalan, Basque, Galician and Canarian parties.
A critical juncture?
Spain’s political landscape in autumn 2024 is shaped by three elections and a series of interlocking political events that are challenging the stability of the country’s democracy. These dynamics reveal a critical moment for Spanish democracy, as institutional trust and political stability face significant challenges.
The divergent results of the 2024 regional elections in Galicia and Catalonia reflect a growing fragmentation within Spain’s political landscape, influenced by both regional identities and national discontent. In European elections, the pattern of ‘punishment’ and ‘protest’ voting crystallized, with the PP’s gains and the rise of far-right parties like VOX and SALF illustrating a rejection of the current national government, as well as the dissatisfaction of considerable sectors of electorate with the European Union. Indeed, the current opinion polls suggest that if national elections took place today, the PP would need VOX’s support in order to establish the government and would face a very strong opposition composed of left, far-left and regional parties, making the political divisions even more rampant. The second scenario would be a very difficult coalition between the PP and regional parties. Finally, a grand coalition is even less likely than a year ago because the polarization seems to be unbridgeable, weakening the stability of Spain in a period of particularly serious international and internal challenges.
Edited by Adam Balcer